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COMMENTS

JURISDICTION OF THIRD PARTY CLAIM AGAINST IRAN-FINALITY OF STAY

ORDER-SEVERABILITY-CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk
Corp. - By Executive Order, ' President Ronald Reagan suspended
claims of United States nationals against Iran and its instrumentalities

which arose out of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the detention of
fifty-two American nationals in 1979.2 Under the agreements securing
the release of the hostages,3 all such claims are within the jurisdiction
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal4 and are subject to binding
arbitration.8 The suspension of these claims in United States courts
has posed procedural problems regarding other principal claims between United States corporations in which Iranian nationals could be
impleaded as third party defendants.
In CTI-Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp.,6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated an order by

the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida to
stay both the main claim involving two United States corporations and
a third party claim against Iran pending a determination by the Claims
Tribunal of its jurisdiction over the third party claim.7 After ruling
1. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
2. Id. at 14,111.
3. Two separate agreements were involved in implementing the hostages' release. The

Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan.
19, 1981, reprinted in, 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Algeria]
outlined the purposes and basic terms of the settlement, and the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement
of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in, 20 I.L.M. 230 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Declaration of Settlement of Claims] provided for the establishment of an
international arbitration tribunal.
4. The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction over all claims justiciable
under the terms of the Declaration of Settlement of Claims, supra note 3, art. II. The
Tribunal is to be composed of nine (or another multiple of three, if so agreed) members,
one-third chosen by Iran, one-third by the United States, and one-third mutually agreed
upon and from whom the president of the Tribunal will be chosen. Id. art. III, para. 1.
All decisions and awards of the Tribunal are final and binding and are enforceable in the
courts of any nation. Id. art. IV, paras. 1, 3.
5. Declaration of Settlement of Claims, supra note 3, at 232.
6. 685 F.2d 1284 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1173 (1983).
7. Id.
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that the stay order was a final order subject to appellate review,8 the
court of appeals held that the district court had abused its discretion
in granting a stay of the entire proceeding and that the trial court
should proceed with the main claim and sever and stay only the third
party claim.,
On January 19, 1981, the United States entered into several agreements with Iran to secure the release of fifty-two Americans held hostage in the United States embassy in Tehran. 10 These agreements provided for: (1) the suspension of United States courts' jurisdiction over
claims against Iran and its instrumentalities arising out of the Islamic
Revolution in Iran and the detention of the American hostages;1 (2)
the submission of such claims to binding arbitration 2 and (3) the release and transfer of Iranian assets held in the United States.13
The agreement to suspend claims covered suits between American
and Iranian nationals pending in United States courts, all attachments
and judgments, and any new litigation based on such claims." The
United States and Iran agreed to settle these claims by binding arbitration"3 through an international tribunal, the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal. 8 The Claims Tribunal has direct jurisdiction over
claims and counterclaims between United States and Iranian nationals 7 in disputes exceeding $250,000.' s Expressly exempted from the
8. Id. at 1288.
9. Id. at 1290.
10. Declaration of Algeria and Declaration of Settlement of Claims, supra note 3. A
third document outlined the specific steps to be taken by both governments regarding
the release and transfer of Iranian assets in the United States. Undertakings of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran with Respect to the Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 229 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Undertakings of the United States and Iran].
11. Declaration of Algeria, supra note 3, para. 11, at 227.
12. Id. Gen. Principles (B), at 224.
13. Id. Gen. Principles (A), at 225; Undertakings of United States and Iran, supra
note 10.
14. Declaration of Algeria, supra note 3, General Principles (B), at 224.
15. Declaration of Settlement of Claims, supra note 3. The Claims Tribunal is to
follow the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) except as modified by either Iran, the United States or the Tribunal.
Id. art. III, para. 2, at 231.
16. Id. art. II, para. 1, at 230.
17. Id. art. II, para. 1, at 230. The agreement defines "national," "claims of nationals," "Iran," and "United States." A "national" is a natural person of Iranian or United
States citizenship, or a legal entity organized under the laws of either country, its states
or territories, and of which at least a 50% interest is held by natural persons who are
citizens of that country. "Claims of nationals" are claims continuously owned, directly or
indirectly, by nationals of one of those countries, from the date the claim arose to the
18.

Footnote 18 appears on page 155.
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Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction are claims made under contracts which
provided that Iranian courts have sole jurisdiction to settle disputes.' 9
A portion of the Iranian assets released and transferred by the
United States under the agreements is to be held in escrow to satisfy
awards against Iran granted by the Claims Tribunal.20 This fund is to
be replenished periodically by Iran so that a minimum balance of $500
million is maintained until all claims filed with the Claims Tribunal
2
have been decided and all awards satisfied. '
The main terms of the United States-Iran agreements were implemented by former President Carter in a series of Executive Orders issued on January 19, 1981.23 The suspension of litigation against Iran
was implemented by President Reagan in Executive Order 12,294 on
February 24, 1981.23 The Executive Order provides that the United
States courts' jurisdiction resumes if the Claims Tribunal determines
that it does not have jurisdiction over a claim. 24 If the Claims Tribunal,
however, makes a determination on the merits of a claim, that decision
is a "final resolution and discharge for all purposes. "25 On July 2, 1981,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the President's authority to
use executive agreements to settle claims of United States nationals
effective date of the agreement. "Iran" and "United States" refer to the respective governments of each country, any political subdivision of that government, or entity or instrumentality controlled by it. Id. art. VII, at 232-33.
18. Id. art. III, para. 3, at 231. Claims for less than $250,000 must be presented to the
Tribunal by the claimant's government. Id.
19. Id. art. II, para. 1, at 231.
20. Declaration of Algeria, supra note 3, para. 7,at 226. The escrow fund is held by
the Central Bank of Algeria. Id.
21. Id. at 226. This arrangement varies from the usual procedure of the United States
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, under the International Claims Settlement Act
of 1949, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1627 (1982). The Commission hears American claims against
foreign states for compensation for private property wrongfully taken when specific authorization is provided by Congress. If the Commission decides favorably on a claim and
authorizes payment, the Secretary of the Treasury makes payment from special funds.
These funds are derived from international agreements or from the liquidation of foreign
assets held in the United States. In some instances, there is a "presettlement adjudication," and the information on the number and amount of claims is used to negotiate a
settlement fund. See generally 1978 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Ann. Rep.
to Congress (1979).
22. Exec. Order No. 12,276, 46 Fed. Reg. 7913 (1981); Exec. Order Nos. 12,277-81, 46
Fed. Reg. 7915-24 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,282, 46 Fed. Reg. 7925 (1981); Exec. Order
No. 12,283, 46 Fed. Reg. 7927 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,284, 46 Fed. Reg. 7929 (1981);
Exec. Order No. 12,285, 46 Fed. Reg. 7931 (1981).
23. Exec. Order No. 12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981).
24. Id. The Executive Order also does not preclude the filing of an action after Feb.
24, 1981, in order to toll the statute of limitations. Id.
25. Id.
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against a foreign state in Dames & Moore v. Regan.2 6 The Court cited
27
ten previous instances of claims settlement by executive agreement.
In October 1980, CTI-Container Leasing Corp. (CTI), a Delaware
corporation, brought suit against Uiterwyk Corp. (Uiterwyk), a Florida
corporation, claiming breach of leases and alleging that Uiterwyk failed
to meet its obligations as lessee.2 8 CTI, a lessor of ocean carrier cargo
containers, had entered into several leases for ocean cargo containers
and related equipment with Uiterwyk, an alleged agent for Iran Express Lines (IEL).2 9 IEL, an alleged instrumentality of Iran, transported the leased equipment to Iran and retained custody of it.30 In
February 1981, approximately one month after the Iran-United States
agreements became effective, Uiterwyk moved to implead Iran and
IEL, claiming that an agency relationship existed necessitating joinder
of Iran and IEL as third party defendants."'
On June 19, 1981, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida stayed CTI's claim against Uiterwyk pending determination by the Claims Tribunal of its jurisdiction over Uiterwyk's
claims against Iran and IEL, pursuant to Executive Order 12,294.1'
26.

453 U.S. 654 (1981). The Court stated that the suspension of claims did not

divest United States courts of jurisdiction but, rather, simply changed the substantive
law. Id. at 684-85.
27. Id. at 680 n.9. Several of these agreements were the basis for amending the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, allowing the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate claims arising under the agreements. Id. at 680-82. For an overview
of the Commission's activity and a graphic summary of programs completed under the
Act, see generally 1978 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission Ann. Rep. to Congress
(1979).
Depending on the number of claims and the source of funds for payment of awards
(bilateral claims agreements or liquidation of foreign national assets in the United
States), most programs have taken three to five years to complete. Id. at 48-49. For additional information on lump-sum settlement agreements, see generally Re, Domestic Adjudication and Lump-Sum Settlement as an Enforcement Technique, 58 AM. Soc'y
INT'L. L. PRoc. 39 (1964); Comment, The Blocked Chinese Assets-United States
Claims Problem: The Lump-Sum Settlement Solution, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L. F. 51 (1979).
28. CTI v. Uiterwyk, 685 F.2d at 1285.
29. Id. at 1286. In NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Uiterwyk Corp., No. 81 Civ. 3866 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 1, 1982), Uiterwyk claimed that it was a general agent for IEL, a fact well publicized in advertisements in newspapers and trade journals. Uiterwyk alleged that IEL was
the only line represented by Uiterwyk which during the relevant time period traded in
Japan and the Far East. Id. slip op. at 3 n.2.
30. CTI v. Uiterwyk, 685 F.2d at 1286-87.
31. Id. at 1286. Uiterwyk also filed separate actions against Iran and IEL in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida: Uiterwyk v. Iran Express
Lines, No. 81-107-Civ. T.K. (M.D. Fla., filed Feb. 15, 1981) and Uiterwyk v. Iran Express
Lines, No. 81-108-Civ. T.K. (M.D. Fla., filed Feb. 15, 1981). Id. at 1286 n.2.
32. Id. at 1286.
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The court did not rule on Uiterwyk's impleader motion, but treated
statements of interest submitted by the United States Department of
Justice in March 1981, as a motion to stay the entire proceeding.33
CTI appealed the stay order and sought to proceed with its claim
against Uiterwyk without the impleader of Iran and IEL.3 4 Uiterwyk
asserted that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review the stay
order, claiming it was not a final order of the district court,35 and that
the stay of the entire' action should be affirmed.36 Uiterwyk claimed
that without the presence of Iran and IEL, it would be prejudiced in
developing evidence regarding its agency relationship with IEL; that it
would incur significant costs if it had to litigate before both the district
IEL were indispencourt and the Claims Tribunal; and that Iran and
37
19(b).
Rule
under
litigation
the
to
sable parties
The threshold question the court of appeals faced was whether the
stay order issued by the district court was a final order within the
meaning of section 1291, ss thus appropriate for appellate review.3 9 In
making this determination, a court is not bound by rigid formulas or
definitions. The United States Supreme Court held in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp."' that "finality" is to be given a "practical
rather than a technical construction."'4 1 The Court added that the purpose of section 1291 is to ". . . disallow appeal from any decision that
is tentative, informal or incomplete. Appeal gives the upper court a
power of review, not one of intervention. So long as the matter remains
33. Id. The court noted that in a similar suit between Uiterwyk and CTI filed in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the United States Department
of Justice filed a statement of interest and suggested that a stay of the entire proceedings may be appropriate. Id. at 1288 n.7. The stay order granted by the trial court applied also to Uiterwyk's separate actions against IEL filed with the district court. See
supra note 31.
34. CTI v. Uiterwyk, 685 F.2d at 1286. CTI claims that the stay order is a final order
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) and reviewable by the court. Id. at 1287. Section 1291
provides: "The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
35. CTI v. Uiterwyk, 685 F.2d at 1287.
36. Id. at 1289.
37. Id.
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982).
39. See supra note 34.
40. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
41. Id. at 546. This case involved the denial by a district court of a motion to require
the plaintiff shareholder to post security for expenses incurred by the defendant corporation as required by state law. The Supreme Court granted review of the trial court's
order as a collateral right, i.e., one that is not an element of the cause of action and
which need not be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. Id.
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open, unfinished or inconclusive there may be ao intrusion by ap'
peal."42
This philosophy was reaffirmed in Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp.,43 where the Court emphasized that the most important
considerations in deciding "finality" are "the inconvenience and costs
of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying justice
by delay on the other."" The court of appeals in CTI v. Uiterwyk relied primarily on Fifth Circuit decisions and their application of the
Cohen-Gillespie principles to stay orders.4
In Hines v. D'Artois,"' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that a stay order by the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana was a "final" decision under section 1291
and subject to appellate review. 47 In this racial discrimination in employment practices case, the district court stayed litigation until the
plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) and pursued final agency action." Based on evidence received by the court, the stayed action would be delayed at
least eighteen months and most likely for a much longer period of
time.' The court of appeals noted that in some instances, as here, a
stay order effectively places a litigant "out of -court" and such action
should be viewed as a "final" decision under section 1291.10 The court
added: "A 'practical' construction requires that when a plaintiff's action is effectively dead, the order which killed it must be viewed as
final. Effective death should be understood to comprehend any extended state of suspended animation."'" Since the district court had
not yet addressed the merits of the case, the danger of denying justice
42. Id.
43. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
44. Id. at 152-53. In this case, the district court upheld defendant's motion to strike
monetary claims by relatives of the deceased victim of an industrial accident. The Court
noted that a "delay of perhaps a number of years in having the brother's and sister's
rights determined might work a great injustice on them." Id. at 153.
45. The Eleventh Circuit, comprised of Alabama, Florida and Georgia, was created in
1981 by a division of the Fifth Circuit. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. 96-452 § 2, 94 Stat.
1994 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)).
46. 531 F.2d 726 (1976).
47. Id. at 732.
48. Id. at 728. The court deferred to the jurisdiction of the EEOC, under title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to make an initial determination. Id. at 728 n.2.
49. Id. at 731-32. The delay would result from the backlog of claims filed with the
regional EEOC office. It could take as long as five and one-half years for a claim to be
completed. Id.
50. Id. at 730.
51. Id.
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by delay outweighed the possible inconvenience and costs of piecemeal
review-the criteria set forth in Gillespie.2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit again
upheld a stay order as a reviewable "final" decision under section 1291
in McKnight v. Blanchard53 by reason of the "death knell" doctrine.5 4
The plaintiff's prisoner suit, against the sheriff, district attorney and
jail for damages and transfer to a medical facility, was stayed by the
district court until he was released from prison, possibly a fourteen
55
year delay.
A stay of proceedings may be either mandatory or discretionary.
The power to stay proceedings is discretionary when it is incidental to
the court's power to control its own docket with.the underlying intent
to economize time and effort of the court, counsel and litigants.5 6 The
court must "weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance." 57 The United States Supreme Court in Landis v. North American Co. 58 noted that review of a discretionary stay by an appellate
court is limited to the question whether the lower court abused its
power5 9 and refused to accept a narrow or mechanical formula for reviewing a discretionary stay.60 In Landis, a case concerning the validity
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the district court
ordered a stay of proceedings pending Supreme Court review of a similar suit in another district court, a probable two year delay. 1 The Supreme Court held that a stay of proceedings is legal only if its effect is
for a moderate or reasonable duration.2 The Court specifically stated
52. Id. at 732.
53. 667 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 479. "An order is held to be appealable when the effect of the denial of an
immediate appeal of collateral orders would effectively deny the litigants their day in
court." Id. The plaintiff argued that after fourteen years it would be impossible to produce witnesses on his behalf. Id. at 478. See also 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3912 (1976) for a discussion of the application of the "death
knell" doctrine.
55. Blanchard, 667 F.2d at 478.
56. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
57. Id. at 255.
58. 299 U.S. 248 (1936).
59. Id. at 255. See also Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1976); McKnight v.,
Blanchard, 667 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1982).
60. 299 U.S. at 255. "[S]ome courts have stated broadly that, irrespective of particular conditions, there is no power by a stay to compel an unwilling litigant to wait upon
the outcome of a controversy to which he is a stranger. . .Such a formula, as we view it,
is too mechanical and narrow." Id.
61. Id. at 256.
62. Id. at 257. The Court stated:
The stay is immoderate and hence unlawful unless so framed in its inception
that its force will be spent within reasonable limits, so far at least as they are
susceptible of prevision and description. When once those limits have been
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that a stay of indefinite duration, in the absence of a pressing need,
would be an abuse of discretion."
These guidelines have been applied by the federal courts in various factual situations. The potential duration of a stay order is an important factor in the appellate court's review. In Hines, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that a stay of action for eighteen
months to possibly five and one-half years was of indefinite duration,
and should be closely scrutinized under Landis' guidelines.6 4 The Fifth
Circuit also cited Landis in McKnight, holding that a stay of action for
seven to fourteen years was indefinite and that the district court did
not "weigh interests and maintain an even balance."6 5
The potential duration of a delay of proceedings is not the only
factor considered in an appellate review of a discretionary stay. The
use of stay orders when similar or concurrent suits are pending in different jurisdictions is another factor which has been addressed by the
courts. The availability of the stay order in such situations is generally
recognized, and a decision to delay proceedings depends on the circumstances of the case. In Landis, the United States Supreme Court discussed the propriety of a stay order when similar suits were pending in
different federal district courts but did not render a decision on the
merits because the actual circumstances of the parties had changed
since the appeal to the Supreme Court was made.6 6 In Will, U.S. District Judge u. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 6 7 the Supreme Court discussed the propriety of a stay order issued by a federal district court
when a concurrent suit was filed in a state court.68 Although the Will
reached, the fetters should fall off. To put the thought in other words, an order
which is to continue by its terms for an immoderate stretch of time is not to be
upheld as moderate because conceivably the court that made it may be persuaded at a later time to undo what it has done.
Id.
63. Id. at 255.
64. Hines, 531 F.2d at 733. The court's discussion of whether the stay order was immoderate rested on the possibility of successful resolution of the dispute by EEOC administrative proceedings, and the protection of the parties' statutory rights and remedies. Id. at 733-37.
65. McKnight, 667 F.2d at 479.
66. Landis, 299 U.S. at 258. The Court reversed the court of appeals' decree and
remanded the case to the district court, directing that a determination on the merits be
made in accordance with the principles laid down in the Court's opinion. Id. at 259.
67. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
68. Id. The district court stayed proceedings on several allegations of federal and
state securities law violations, except for a Rule 10b-5 violation under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts,
since the state court had already set a trial date. Id. at 659. When Judge Will refused to
reconsider his stay order or to certify an interlocutory appeal, respondent sought and
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court noted that the federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over one of
the issues raised, it reaffirmed the district court's discretionary power
to stay proceedings because of a concurrent state suit." But the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Hines that a stay of action
pending final administrative
agency action, not yet initiated, was an
70
abuse of discretion.

Prior to the Eleventh Circuit's consideration of CTI v. Uiterwyk,
three other district courts had entertained cases brought by various
plaintiffs against Uiterwyk in which the defendant moved to implead
Iran and IEL as third party defendants. 71 In each instance, the district
court severed and stayed the third party claim and proceeded to trial
with the main action. 72 In NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Uiterwyk Corp.,7 a

case factually similar to CTI v. Uiterwyk, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York found that plaintiff NIC's
claims against Uiterwyk were "separate and severable from Uiterwyk's
third party claims against Iran and IEL.''74 Although Uiterwyk as-

serted that it was acting as a general agent for IEL, the district court
found that the leases Uiterwyk entered into with NIC made no mention of IEL and that the defendant did not deny nondisclosure to NIC
of its agency relationship with IEL at the time it entered into the leasing contracts. 75 Since Uiterwyk could be found separately liable to
NIC, the plaintiff was not required to sue IEL directly. 76 Consequently,

any stay of NIC's claim against Uiterwyk would have been discretionwas granted a writ of mandamus by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit to
compel Judge Will to immediately proceed with the 10b-5 claims. Id. at 660.
69. Id. at 665. The Court distinguished Will, in which the federal court proceedings
were stayed, from Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976), in which the federal court proceedings had been dismissed because of a concurrent state suit. Id. at 664-65. Thus, the issue in Will was not the federal court's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction. Id, at 664-65.
'70. Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d '726 (1976). See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying
text.
71. NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Uiterwyk Corp., No. 81 Civ. 3866 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1982);
Cotco Leasing Co. v. Uiterwyk Corp., No. 80-706 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 9, 1981); Xtra, Inc. v.
Uiterwyk Corp., No. 79-1021-Civ. T.H. (M.D.Fla. Aug. 25, 1981).
72. CTI v. Uiterwyk, 685 F.2d at 1289.
73. No. 81 Civ. 3866 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1982). NIC Leasing, Inc., an Illinois corporation, leased cargo containers and related equipment to Uiterwyk. Uiterwyk failed to
make payments due under the leases or to return the equipment which was in the possession of IEL, Uiterwyk's alleged principal. Id. slip op. at 2-4.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 3 n.2.
76. Id. at 6. The court noted also that a cross-claim in tort or quasi-contract against
IEL or Iran was not compulsory and that plaintiff NIC could present such claims to the
Claims Tribunal if it chose to do so. Id.
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ary." The court concluded that the danger of denying justice to the
plaintiff by delaying the proceedings outweighed any possible prejudice
to the defendant.78 One factor considered in this balancing of interests
was the indefinite delay before Uiterwyk's claims against Iran and IEL
came before the Claims Tribunal. 79 Since these claims would not be
determined until a court ruled in favor of NIC and against Uiterwyk,
an abstention by the district court deferring to the Claims Tribunal's
jurisdiction would be "circuitous."8 0
In CTI v. Uiterwyk, the court of appeals' holding that a stay order
was a final order subject to appellate review under section 1291 relied
primarily on Fifth Circuit decisions."1 The court noted that in Hines
the Fifth Circuit had held a stay order appealable as a final order of
the district court on three grounds. First, the Cohen-Gillespie principles that finality be given a practical construction included extended
delays that "killed" plaintiff's action. Second, factual circumstances
causing protracted delay and effectively putting the plaintiff out of
court must be considered. And third, the danger of denying justice because of unreasonable delay outweighed the inconvenience and cost of
piecemeal review.8
The Eleventh Circuit decided that similar factors existed in the
instant case. The stay order granted to Uiterwyk by the district court
was operative pending a determination by the Claims Tribunal of its
jurisdiction over Uiterwyk's claims against the impleaded parties, Iran
and IEL, a decision which could be months or even years away.8 3 Consequently, CTI's claim was in "suspended animation" and the plaintiff
was "effectively out of court." ' The court asserted that such an indefinite delay would deny justice to CTI. Uiterwyk's argument that it
would suffer from inconsistent results due to piecemeal review was discounted. The court noted that the leases contained no indication that
Uiterwyk was acting as an agent for IEL,s5 and that CTI did not insti77. Id. at 7.
78. Id. The court discounted Uiterwyk's assertions that litigation of the primary complaint would result in substantial costs for duplicative proceedings, or prejudice the defendant in developing evidence regarding its agency relationship with IEL and other defenses. Id. at 7-9.
79. Id. at 9.
80. Id.
81. CTI v. Uiterwyk, 685 F.2d at 1287.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1288 (quoting Hines v. D'Artois, 531 F.2d 726, 730 (5th Cir. 1976)).
85. Id. at 1286 n.4. If an agent appears to be acting on his own account, he is a party
to a contract even if, in fact, he is acting on behalf of an undisclosed principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 322 (1958).
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tute an action against either Iran or IEL.86 Therefore, Uiterwyk could
be found individually liable to CTI. The court reasoned that
Uiterwyk's claims against Iran and IEL, as a separate action, were
"contingent upon a finding in the district court of Uiterwyk's liability
to CTI before the Tribunal [could] accurately enter a judgment in the
Uiterwyk and Iran-IEL dispute."8 Consequently, plaintiff CTI was unduly burdened by the stay order, and the court of appeals held that the
trial court's decision was a final order subject to appellate review under
section 1291.88
After the court established its appellate jurisdiction, it addressed
the merits of the stay order. The court determined that the stay of
proceedings between Uiterwyk and the impleaded parties, Iran and
IEL, pursuant to Executive Order 12,294, was mandatory. 9 The court
recognized the lower court's authority to stay proceedings pending the
outcome of related suits in another forum, 90 and noted that its review
was limited to an abuse of discretion standard.9 1 The court could not
* . accurately predict the time CTI [would] be forced to stand aside
if it is required to await the Tribunal's determination of its jurisdiction
to hear these claims (Uiterwyk's claims against Iran and IEL)."' 2 Cit86. 685 F.2d at 1288. A third party may sue either the agent or the principal, or join
them in one action, where the agency was initially undisclosed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY §§ 209, 337 (1958). See also NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Uiterwyk Corp., No. 81 Civ.
3866 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1982). "Even though the third party defendants may be ultimately liable, as asserted by Uiterwyk in its third party complaint, plaintiff is not required to sue them directly .... Plaintiff is permitted to sue on its claims against defendant Uiterwyk, leaving aside those claims against Iran that might be heard by the
Tribunal." Id. slip op. at 6.
87. 685 F.2d at 1288. If CTI is successful in its suit and Uiterwyk satisfies the judgment, Uiterwyk would have a claim for indemnification from IEL and Iran for damages
and expenses. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 438, comment a, § 439, comment g
(1958). See also NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Uiterwyk Corp., No. 81 Civ. 3866, slip op. at 9
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1982). The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are not conclusive regarding
the effect the Claims Tribunal should give to a finding of fact by a United States District
Court in cases decided against Uiterwyk. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 33, 37 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1977). Any judgment against Uiterwyk would
probably be introduced as evidence under articles 24 and 25 of the rules subject to the
Claims Tribunal's determination of admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight. Id.
arts. 24 & 25.
88. 685 F.2d at 1288.
89. Id.
90. Id. See also supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
91. 685 F.2d at 1288. See also supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
92.

685 F.2d at 1288. See generally Brill, No Gold at the Hague, Am. Law., Sept.

1982, at 1 (conservative estimates predict an eleven year effort to clear some 2,800 claims
under $250,000 each, and an additional 650 claims over $250,000); Tagliabue, Panel
Slowly Untangling Claims on Iran, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1982, at DI, col. 3 (ten awards
were made by the Claims Tribunal during its first year of operation).
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ing McKnight, the court emphasized that a stay of indefinite duration
was immoderate and, thus, an abuse of discretion. 3
In answer to Uiterwyk's arguments supporting the stay order, the
court made several points. First, Uiterwyk would not be prejudiced in
developing evidence to support its agency defense since the agency was
not in issue between CTI and Uiterwyk; the contract between them
was the focus of the principal action." Nor would Iran's or IEL's absence hamper the defendant's impossibility of performance and force
majeure defenses since the plaintiff did not question the factual bases
for such defenses." Second, Uiterwyk would not be subject to duplicative costs in litigating two separate actions where its claim against Iran
and IEL was separable and within the Claims Tribunal's jurisdiction.
The court determined that any extra costs Uiterwyk might incur by
proceeding in two separate suits did not outweigh the injustice to CTI
from a stay of its claim.9 7 Third, joinder of Iran and IEL as third party
defendants was feasible since Executive Order 12,294-did not deny the
federal courts' jurisdiction over claims against such parties, it merely
suspended such claims." 8 Under this analysis, the court did not reach
the question of dismissal of the action under Rule 19(b).",
In support of its conclusion, the court cited the action taken by
other federal district courts in similar cases against Uiterwyk in which
the leasing agent moved to implead Iran and IEL.1°° These courts severed and stayed the third party claims and proceeded to trial with the
main action.' 01
The court's main concern in CTI v. Uiterwyk was how to balance
the implementation of the Iran-United States agreements and Executive Order 12,294 suspending claims by United States nationals against
Iran against the plaintiff's demand for justice in a legitimate claim involving two American corporations. As the United States Supreme
Court commented in Landis: "Only in rare circumstances will a litigant
in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another
settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both."' 02 The
93.

685 F.2d at 1288.

94.

Id. at 1289.

95.

Id.

96.
97.

Id.
Id.

98. Id. at 1290.
99. Id. at 1289-90. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b) applies when joinder of parties indispensable to the action is not feasible. Id. at 1290 n.10.
100. NIC Leasing, Inc. v. Uiterwyk Corp., No. 81 Civ. 3866 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1982).
101. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
102. 299 U.S. 248, 255 (1936). See also NIC v. Uiterwyk, No. 81 Civ. 3866, slip op. at

19831
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Claims Tribunal could make findings regarding whether Uiterwyk was
an agent for IEL or whether Uiterwyk's specific acts in leasing shipping equipment were authorized within the scope of the agency agreement between the parties. If Uiterwyk's claims against Iran and IEL
were determined by the Claims Tribunal prior to CTI's suit in a
United States district court, a district court might give collateral estoppel effect to certain findings of the Claims Tribunal. 103
In bifurcating adjudication of the liability issue, the court of appeals has not minimized all risks to the principal parties involved in
the litigation. The defendant Uiterwyk is most vulnerable. For example, Uiterwyk may be found liable to CTI, as an agent of IEL, for a
greater amount than it can collect in a successful suit against Iran and
IEL before the Claims Tribunal. Iran and IEL could counterclaim
against their agent Uiterwyk, thereby reducing the latter's award, 104 or
Iran and IEL could succeed in their defense and be found not liable. 05
7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 1982): "The prejudice resulting to Uiterwyk if all claims are not
stayed must be weighed against the obvious prejudice to plaintiff if it is deprived of its
choice of forum, choice of defendant, and choice of remedy." Id. at 7. In some instances a
federal court will abstain in favor of a state forum. Typically, abstention is appropriate
when: (a) a federal constitutional question may become moot depending on the state
court's determination of pertinent law; (b) the state law issues presented require a prior
determination by the state courts; (c) the federal court suit was initiated to restrain state
criminal proceedings. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 814-17 (1975).
103. If these issues have been litigated in a prior suit in which all parties had an
opportunity to participate, they will not be relitigated. See Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith
v. Prometco Co., 470 F. Supp. 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (the court allowed defendant agent to
avail himself of the preclusive effect of a prior foreign judgment even though he was not
a party to the earlier proceeding).
The effect given by United States courts to findings by the Claims Tribunal depends
on local law. Iran is not a signatory to the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 19, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3. The Convention is applied to legal relationships considered commercial
under the national law of the United States and is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982),
thereby bringing foreign arbitral awards within the ambit of the federal arbitration statute governing maritime and interstate commerce transactions.
See generally Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J.
1049 (1961); Smith, InternationalRes Judicata and CollateralEstoppel in the United
States, 9 UCLA L. REV. 44 (1962); von Mehran, Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in
the United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 401 (1977).
104. Declaration of Settlement Claims, supra note 3. The Claims Tribunal has jurisdiction over counterclaims arising out of the same subject matter constituting a national's claims. Id. at 230-31.
105. There is also the possibility that, for some reason, the Claims Tribunal would
not assert jurisdiction over Uiterwyk's claim against Iran and IEL. In such an instance,
the claim would revive in the United States district court where it was filed. See supra
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CTI would remain relatively isolated from claims by Iran and IEL unless either party brought direct actions against the other before the
Claims Tribunal. If CTI does not prevail in its action against Uiterwyk,
it is unlikely that CTI will be able to proceed against Iran and IEL,
since the deadline for filing a claim with the Claims Tribunal will have
passed. 106
In balancing the interests of the parties, the court of appeals has
interposed a judicial concern for delimiting United States and international jurisdiction of claims by United States parties arising out of the
Iranian crisis. Although CTI could have joined the Iranian parties as
defendants and sought the jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal, it chose
not to do so. To force CTI to stand aside until defendant Uiterwyk's
separate claims against Iran and IEL are determined by the Claims
Tribunal would have the same practical effect as CTI suing the Iranian
parties directly. CTI chose a United States corporation as its adversary
and selected a United States court as the forum for adjudicating its
claim. The Eleventh Circuit's decision in favor of CTI shows a judicial
concern for fair, prompt and efficient administration of justice for
United States plaintiffs who, although they did not directly assume
risk in doing business abroad, were adversely affected by the Iranian
crisis.
Geraldine Matise

note 24 and accompanying text.
106. Declaration of Settlement of Claims, supra note 3. The filing deadline with the
Claims Tribunal is one year from the effective date of the agreement or six months after
the appointment of the President of the Tribunal, whichever is later. Id. art. III, para. 4,
at 232.

